

DD/S&T 3445-68

5 September 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Coordination of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Effort

REFERENCE : Memorandum to DD/S&T from D/DCI/NIPE,
Dated 27 August 1968, Subject: DCI Report
on the Community to the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (DD/S&T 3363/68)


1. The reference requested a DD/S&T submission to the Director's annual report to the PFIAB on "Coordination of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Effort" and suggested that responses be grouped under: a) Major coordination problems, b) Gaps, deficiencies, and undesirable duplication, and c) Recommended actions. This very broad topic was discussed by senior individuals on our staff, and the results of our quick worm's eye view are as given below. We were asked for an Office contribution by [] and have largely confined our comments to the analysis side of intelligence problems.

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
2. Major problems existing in the coordination of the intelligence community. The major problem here is that Departmental policies affect both current intelligence and estimates. The recent and continuing battles over the mission of the Tallinn SA-5 sites is symptomatic of this. While we could not reasonably expect policy to be divorced from intelligence, we feel that there is too much blind subservience to a policy by individuals at the working level in DOD, with the result that they are often neither free to compromise positions nor willing to advise their superiors to change a position, when new evidence makes it perfectly clear that these things should be done.

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


3. Significant gaps, deficiencies and undesirable duplication of the various U.S. intelligence agencies. As gaps we would highlight: a) Poor inter-agency access to raw and partly processed data, b) Poor inter-agency dissemination of contractor finished reports, and c) Poor feedback of technical intelligence data to U.S. laboratories engaged in weapons and counter-weapon development programs. We feel the greatest deficiency remains the gross imbalance between the huge fund expenditures for intelligence collection and the trickle spent for analysis. People have been paying lip service to this for years but nothing is done about it. The real reason for this state of affairs seems to be that there has been constructed a budgetary machine which makes it relatively easy to get funds to purchase hardware but next to impossible to hire another analyst.



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4. Specific actions to strengthen the effectiveness of the over-all intelligence effort. In raw terms, whoever controls the money has the real power. If one applied this principle to the intelligence community, then it seems that the single action which would tidy things up would be to give the DCI the power to unilaterally veto expenditures for collection, processing, or analysis by any agency of the intelligence community, with appeal only to the President.



DAVID S. BRANDWEIN

Director

Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

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